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1 
THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982, SECTIONS 25 AND 35* 
by 
Kent McNeil** 
The Constitution Act, 1982, proclaimed in force as of April 17, 
1982, supplements the other Acts and Orders which already made up 
the Constitution of Canada. It does not detract from any of the 
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada guaranteed by earlier 
constitutional instruments. Section 91(24) of the 1867 
Constitution Act, the Rupert's Land Order, and the Natural 
Resources Transfer Agreements, which have been discussed earlier 
this week, all continue to apply. In fact, they are specifically 
included in the new Act's definition of the Constitution of 
Canada. 
However, the 1982 Constitution Act goes further than previous 
constitutional instruments by providing additional guarantees for 
the rights of aboriginal peoples. 
Section 25 
As everyone knows, the 1982 Act gave Canada a Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. Section 15 of the Charter, which came into force on 
April 17, 1985, provides that everyone is equal before and under 
the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of 
the law without discrimination, particularly discrimination based 
on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or 
mental or physical disability. It might be said that the special 
status and rights which Canada's aboriginal peoples have are 
inconsistent with this equality provision. 
To avoid this result, a saving provision was included within the 
Charter itself. This is section 25, which provides: 
25. The guarantee in this Charter of certain 
rights and freedoms shall not be construed so 
as to abrogate or derogate from any 
* This paper was prepared for and presented orally at a seminar on 
"First Nations and the Constitution - What Now" at· the Banff 
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aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms 
that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada including 
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been 
recognized by the Royal Proclamation of 
October 7, 1763; and 
(b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by 
way of land claims agreements or may be so 
acquired. 
The language of this section is very broad. It refers 
specifically to treaty and aboriginal rights, but also mentions 
other rights and freedoms, including those recognized by the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763, and any rights or freedoms that now exist or 
may be acquired by land claims agreements. 
A question I have asked myself is whether section 25 protects 
rights which status Indians have under the Indian Act from Charter 
challenges. I think it does. These are rights which no other 
Canadians have, and which may offend the equality rights 
provision. Parliament nonetheless has the authority under section 
91(24) of the 1867 Constitution Act to make laws for Indians and 
lands reserved for the Indians. The Indian Act was passed to 
fulfil this legislative mandate. So even without section 25, the 
Indian Act, or at least any provisions in it which have a 
legitimate federal purpose, may have continued to be valid, even 
though discriminating on the basis of race. But the inclusion of 
section 25 in the Charter fortifies this conclusion, and in my 
view protects the Indian Act generally from the Charter. 
Provisions of the Indian Act which discriminate on the basis of 
sex, however, should have been invalidated by section 28 of the 
Charter, which provides that, notwithstanding anything in the 
Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed 
equally to male and female persons. This would seem to apply to 
section 25, placing a restriction on the rights and freedoms of 
aboriginal peoples referred to there. So as far as the Indian Act 
is concerned, the provisions of that Act which discriminated on 
the basis of sex may have been void as of April 17, 1982, three 
years before the Act was amended to remove those discriminatory 
provisions. 
So what is the effect of section 25? It seems fairly certain that 
section 25 is merely a saving provision--it is not in itself a 
source of rights. On this, the case law decided since the Charter 
came into force has been quite consistent. 
In Steinhauer v. R., [1985] 3 C.N.L.R. 187, Madame Justice Veit of 
the Alberta Courtof Queen's Bench said (at p.191) that section 25 
"is a shield and does not add to aboriginal rights". She 
accordingly held that section 25 provided no protection against 
[1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 
3 
The Constitution Act, 1982, Sections 25 and 35 
the federal Fisheries Act to a status Indian who was allegedly 
exercising his treaty right to fish. 
In Augustine and Augustine v. ~; Barlow v. !.!_, [1987] 1 C.N.L.R. 
20 (N.B.C.A.), Stratton, Chief Justice of New Brunswick, agreed 
(at p.44) with Peter Hogg when he wrote in the second edition of 
his text, Constitutional Law of Canada, that s.25 "does not create 
any new rights, or even fortify existing rights. It is simply a 
saving provision, included to make clear that the Charter is not 
to be construed as derogating from 'any aboriginal, treaty or 
other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada'." The Chief Justice held that section 25 provided no 
protection against the provincial Fish and Wildlife Act to Micmac 
Indians who were hunting at ~ight. 
Section 35 
I would now like to move on to section 35 of the 1982 Constitution 
Act, which is the more important provision relating to aboriginal 
peoples' rights. It reads like this: 
35.(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are 
hereby recognized and affirmed. 
( 2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of 
Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit and Metis 
peoples of Canada. 
(3) For greater certainty, in subsection 
(1) "treaty rights" includes rights that now 
exist by way of land claims agreements or may 
be so acquired. 
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights 
referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed 
equally to male and female persons. 
As originally enacted, section 35 contained only subsections (1) 
and (2). The provision specifying that "treaty rights" include 
rights acquired by existing and future land claims agreements was 
added in 1984 after being agreed to at the March 1983 
constitutional conference. This is an important provision, for it 
gives constitutional protection to the James Bay Agreement (see 
Eastmain Band v. Gilpin, [1987] 3 C.N.L.R. 54 (Que.Prov.Ct.)), and 
ensures that aboriginal peoples will not be giving up 
constitutionally protected rights for unprotected rights in any 
future land claims settlements. The provision that aboriginal and 
treaty rights are guaranteed equally to male and female persons 
was also added in 1984, as a result of the 1983 accord. 
[1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 
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The first thing to note is that, unlike section 25, section 35 is 
not in the Charter. It forms a separate part of the 1982 Act 
(i.e. Part II), which comes immediately after the Charter. This 
gives section 35 some advantages. For example, it means that it 
is not limited by section 1 of the Charter, which says that the 
rights and freedoms set out in the Charter are "subject only to 
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society." (Note that section 
25 has been held to be subject to this restriction: see R. v. 
Nicholas and Bear, [1985] 4 C.N.L.R. 153, where New Brunswick 
Provincial Court Judge Desjardins said (at pp.162-63) that the 
Fisheries Act and regulations thereunder are for the purpose of 
conservation and management of the fisheries, and as such are 
reasonable restrictions on aboriginal rights to fish. He also 
held that section 35 of the 1982 Constitution Act did not protect 
these rights, because they were not in existence when that Act 
came into force. We will return to this issue in a moment.) 
Moreover, because section 35 is not in the Charter, it is not 
subject to section 33 which permits Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures to override certain of the Charter's provisions. 
The words "abo~1ginal peoples of Canada" are defined in section 35(2) as including "the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of 
Canada." But no further definition of those terms is provided. 
The term "Indian" cannot mean the same thing as in section 91(24) 
of the 1867 Constitution Act because the Supreme Court of Canada 
has held that the term "Indians" in section 91(24) includes Inuit 
(see Re Eskimos, [1939] 2 D.L.R. 417), and convincing arguments 
have be--e;-m~~hat Metis are also included in section 91(24) (see 
Clem Chartier, "'Indian': An Analysis of the Term as Used in 
Section 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867" (1978-79), 
43 Sask.L.Rev. 37). Yet in section 35 of the 1982 Act these three 
groups are differentiated. So "Indian" must have a narrower 
meaning than in section 91(24). 
One approach to this issue would be to apply the Indian Act 
definition of "Indian" to section 35. The result would be that 
the term "Indian" in section 35 would refer to status Indians. 
However, this would seem to be inappropriate because it would give 
Parliament the legislative authority to define a term in the 
Constitution. Moreover, in 1985 Parliament amended the Indian Act 
so as to expand the class of status Indians to include some 
persons who had lost status or who never had status. So the 
definition of the class known as status Indians has changed since 
1982. If the Indian Act definition of "Indian" is adopted for the 
purposes of section 35 of the 1982 Act, this means that Parliament 
has already unilaterally amended the Constitution. Clearly 
Parliament has no power to do this. 
[1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 
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Another approach to the definition of "Indian" in section 35, and 
to the definition of "Inuit" as well, would be to apply a test 
based on such things as racial blood content, cultural 
affiliation, group acceptance, self-identification or a 
combination of these factors. But section 35 provides no guidance 
as to the appropriateness of using any of these various factors to 
develop workable definitions. 
The problem of defining the term "Metis" is even more complex. 
Are the Metis all persons of mixed blood, or only those persons of 
mixed blood who did not associate themselves with Indian tribes or 
bands? If one adopts a mixed blood approach, what percentage of 
Indian (or Inuit) blood is necessary to make a person Metis? 
(Apparently Louis Riel had only one-eighth Indian blood.) Or 
should the Metis be limited as a group to the descendants of those 
persons who made up the "Metis Nation" in the Red River region, 
and who later gathered around Batoche, in the nineteenth century? 
These questions have yet to be resolved. Perhaps the best 
solution would be a constitutional amendment giving the aboriginal 
peoples themselves the power to determine who belongs to their 
respective groups, as part of broader powers of self-government. 
However, to do so one still has to decide to whom this power 
should be given, which itself involves making some determination 
of who the Indians, Inuit and Metis are. Perhaps this is not as 
big a problem as it may seem to be, for the core of each of those 
groups is probably fairly easily identified, and so persons who 
are within the core could initially be given the power to 
determine how broad the definition of the group should be. 
Turning to subsection (1) of section 35, it recognizes and affirms 
the "existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal 
peoples of Canada". "Treaty rights" must include rights preserved 
or acquired by treaties entered into between Indian tribes or 
nations and the Crown, both before and since Confederation. 
Examples are treaty land entitlements (~ rights to have 
reserves set aside), annuity rights, and hunting and fishing 
rights. As we have seen, any rights acquired before or after 
April 17, 1982, by land claims agreements, i.e. by settlement of 
comprehensive claims based on aboriginal title, are also 
explicitly included by subsection (3). Possibly any rights which 
the aboriginal peoples may have by virtue of international 
treaties are covered as well. An ex~mple may be the Jay Treaty of 
1794, entered into by Britain and the United States, which 
provided that Indians living on either side of the international 
boundary between Canada and the United States were to be free to 
pass across the boundary, and to trade freely with one another and 
carry their own goods across the boundary duty free. 
[1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 
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The aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by section 35 would 
be any rights which the aboriginal peoples have as the first 
inhabitants of Canada. These would include land rights based on 
aboriginal title, hunting and fishing rights, and the right to 
retain at least some of their customary laws (particularly in the 
area of family law: see Re Tagornak Adoption Petition, [1984] 1 
C.N.L.R. 185, where Mr. Justice Marshall of the Northwest 
Territories Supreme Court held that he was bound by section 35 to 
recognize a customary Inuit adoption). Arguably, an aboriginal 
right to self-government was also recognized and affirmed. 
What, then, is the effect of section 35 on the rights recognized 
and affirmed thereby? Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act 
provides that the Constitution "is the supreme law of Canada, and 
any law that is inconsistent with the provis~ons of the 
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force 
or effect." Aboriginal and treaty rights are thus given 
constitutional status, so that any federal or provincial law which 
is inconsistent with them should be of no effect to that extent. 
This is extremely important because in the past aboriginal and 
treaty rights were subject to federal legislation, and aboriginal 
hunting rights, at least, were to some extent subject to 
provincial legislation (treaty rights were generally shielded 
against provincial legislation, because section 88 of the Indian 
Act provided them with this protection). 
There is, however, a catch to this because only existing 
aboriginal and treaty rights are recognized and affirmed by 
section 35. In an article I wrote shortly after the 1982 Act was 
proclaimed ("The Constitutional Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples 
of Canada", [1982] 4 Supreme Court L.R. 255), I argued that 
"existing" means unextinguished. Aboriginal or treaty rights that 
had been completely abrogated prior to April 17, 1982, would not 
be revived by the section. However, rights that had been merely 
restricted or limited by legislation, but not abrogated, would 
still be in existence, and so would be caught by section 35. The 
legislation which restricted those rights would therefore be of no 
force or effect to the extent that it was inconsistent with them. 
The example I gave was the federal Migratory Birds Convention Act. 
Although that Act has infringed both aboriginal and treaty rights, 
prior to April 17, 1982, it was upheld by the Supreme Court as 
valid legislation. My argument was that the Migratory Birds 
Convention Act merely restricted the hunting rights of aboriginal 
peoples--it did not abrogate them. Accordingly, those rights were 
still in existence in 1982, although they could not be fully 
exercised. They should therefore have been recognized and 
affirmed by section 35, making the Migratory Birds Convention Act 
of no force or effect to the extent that it is inconsistent with 
them. 
[1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 
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To date, however, the courts have not adopted this line of 
reasoning. 
In R. v. Eninew, [1984] 2 C.N.L.R. 122, Mr. Justice Gerein of the 
Saskatchewan--COurt of Queen's Bench upheld the conviction of a 
Treaty 10 Indian for hunting ducks out of season contrary to the 
Migratory Birds Regulations. The offence was committed on April 
29, 1982, just twelve days after the 1982 Constitution Act came 
into force. Mr. Justice Gerein said the issue to be decided was 
whether section 35 of the Act had the effect of invalidating the 
Migratory Birds Regulations insofar as they apply to Indians, 
restoring to them an unfettered right to hunt. He began by 
stating (at p.124) that the worcl "existing" relates to the entire 
phrase "aboriginal and treaty rights", not just to the word 
"aboriginal". This is no doubt correct. As to the effect of the 
word "existing", he said (at p.124) that it limits the rights of 
the aboriginal peoples "to those rights which were in being or 
which were in actuality at the time when the Constitution Act came 
into effect." At that time, he continued (at p.125), "Indians did 
not enjoy an unrestricted right to hunt •••• [T]his treaty right 
had been abridged by a regulation of Parliament acting within its 
authority. The Constitution Act did not have the effect of 
repealing the regulation or rendering it invalid. Rather the 
Constitution Act only recognized and secured the status quo." 
This decision was upheld by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, but 
without dealing with the effect of section 35. (The Court of 
Appeal held that the regulation in question did not violate the 
accused's treaty rights, as the treaty provided for government 
regulation of hunting rights. This conclusion, however, is 
inconsistent with the decision of the Northwest Territories Court 
of Appeal in B:..!.. v. Sikyea (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150, affirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Canada, [1964] S.C.R. 642.) 
7 
In ~ v. Sutherland and Napash, [1984] 4 C.N.L.R. 133, the 
distinction between rights that were abrogated and those that were 
merely restricted was put directly to Ontario Provincial Court 
Judge Cloutier with respect to two Treaty 9 Indians who had been 
charged with possession of geese and ducks contrary to the 
Migratory Birds Convention Act. Judge Cloutier apparently 
accepted the distinction, and said an argument coulcl be made that 
restricted rights still exist and are therefore retnstated by 
virtue of section 35, irrespective of the Migratory Birds 
Convention Act. However, he went on to hold that, on the basis of 
authority (mainly the Sikyea case, supra), the Migratory~irds 
Conve~tion Act did not merely restrict treaty rights--it abrogated 
them in these circumstances. This is a questionable conclusion, 
in my view unsupported by the authorities Cloutier referred to, 
which were not concerned with the distinction between restriction 
and abrogation of rights. Although it is true that the Act places 
Indian s in the same position as other Can ad i ans insofar as the 
[1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 
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hunting of most migratory birds is concerned, it does allow 
Indians to take certain birds (~.&.!._ scoters, auks and guillemots) 
for food or clothing, and so preserves their special right to hunt 
to some extent. In other words, their special right to hunt 
migratory birds was not entirely taken away by the Act. 
Moreover, the question which I think must be asked in these 
circumstances is whether a right to hunt can be broken down into 
separate rights to hunt different species or categories of game. 
Is the right to hunt mallard ducks or Canada geese, or even 
migratory birds generally, a right which can be isolated and 
abrogated, while the right (or rights) to hunt other types of game 
continues? Or is there a general right to hunt which is merely 
restricted by a prohibition on the hunting of certain species or 
categories of game? In my opinion, it is more in keeping with 
general principles of constitutional interpretation to read 
section 35(1) as referring to broad classes of rights, such as the 
right to hunt or the right to fish, or even the right to hunt and 
fish, rather than fragmenting the rights protected by that section 
into narrow rights to take certain species or categories of game 
or fish. If this approach is adopted, then aboriginal and treaty 
rights to hunt and fish could have been in existence on April 17, 
1982, even though those rights were no longer exercisable on that 
date where certain species or categories of game and fish were 
concerned. (See, however,~ v. Fle.!_!, [1987) 3 C.N.L.R. 70, 
where Manitoba Provincial Court Judge Martin distinguished between 
extinguishment and regulation, and concluded that the !!i.zratory 
Birds Convention Act extinguished the right of treaty Indians to 
hunt migratory birds because, in his mistaken view, it placed 
Indians on exactly the same footing as white recreational hunters. 
Martin went on to hold that, due to section 35(1) of the 1982 
Constitution Act, the Migratory Birds Convention Act is now of no 
force or effect to the extent that it is inconsistent with that 
right, but given his conclusion that the right had been 
extinguished prior to April 17, 1982, this is probably wrong.) 
Another federal statute that has been challenged as being 
inconsistent with aborigi~al and treaty rights and therefore 
constitutionally invalid to that extent is the Fisheries Act. 
Most of the recent cases dealing with the applicability of that 
Act and the regulations made under it to aboriginal peoples have 
held the word "existing" in section 35(1) of the 1982 Constitution 
Act to mean that limitations on aboriginal and treaty rights to 
fish that were already in place on April 17, 1982, continue to be 
effective. 
For example, in Steinhauer v. R., supra, Alberta Court of Queen's 
Bench Judge Veit held that the accused did not have an existing 
treaty right to fish without a licence because that right had been 
[1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 
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taken away by the Alberta Fishery Regulations prior to April 17, 
1982. 
Similarly, in R. v. Seward, [1985] 4 C.N.L.R. 167, British 
Columbia Provincial Court Judge Greer, in convicting six treaty 
Indians of offences under the British Columbia Fishery (General) 
~ulations, agreed (at pp.181-82) with the conclusion reached by 
Mr. Justice Gerein in R. v. Eninew, supra, that the word 
"existing" limits the rights of aboriginal peoples "to those 
rights which were in being or which were in actuality at the time 
when the Constitution Act, 1982 came into effect". 
In R. v. Hare and Debassi~, [1985] 3 C.N.L.R. 139, Mr. Justice 
Thorson of the Ontario Court of Appeal, in applying the Ontario 
Fishery Regulations to two treaty Indians, adopted (at p.155) the 
interpretation of section 35(1) that Professor P.W. Hogg offered 
in his Canada Act 1982 Annotated (1982) at p.83 that aboriginal 
and treaty rights have been "' constitutionalized' prospectively, 
so that past (validly enacted) alterations or extinguishments 
continue to be legally effective, but future legislation which 
purports to make any further alterations or extinguishments is of 
no force or effect." Thorson J.A. went on to say that "whatever 
right the respondents' forefathers may once have enjoyed under 
Treaty 94 in relation to fishing by means of gill nets had become 
lost by operation of federal legislation well before these charges 
were brought." (Note that Thorson J.A. 's comments on the effect 
o f s e c t i on 3 5 ( 1 ) we re p r o b a b 1 y o b i t ~ , b e c au s e he had p re v i o u s 1 y 
said that the relevance of that section was not apparent to him, 
as the offences had occurred in 1980.) 
9 
Professor Hogg's interpretation of section 35(1) was also accepted 
in~ v. Nicholas and Bear,~~' by New Brunswick Provincial 
Court Judge Desjardins, who added (at p.165) that section 35 "has 
not changed ••• rights existing on the 17 April 1982, but has in 
fact 'recognized' and 'affirmed' constitutionally the Indian 
rights as they stood as affected by valid legislation and case law 
on that particular date (i.e. a 'freeze')." 
Finally, in~ v. Googoo, [1987] 2 C.N.L.R. 137, Nova Scotia 
Provincial Court Judge O'Connell said (at p.141) that "[e]xisting 
means unextinguished", and that any aboriginal or treaty right 
which the accused Indian may have had to possess a fishing net had 
been extinguished by the Nova Scotia Fishery Regulations before 
April 17, 1982. (Note that the regulation in question in Goo.&.Q_Q 
had been amended in 1983, but O'Connell decided that did not 
matter, as the new regulation was basically the same as the old 
one, and so did not suppress any rights enjoyed by the accused on 
April 17, 1982.) 
[1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 
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These decisions, like the Migratory Birds Convention Act cases, 
reveal a tendency on the part of the courts to regard aboriginal 
and treaty rights as divisible into small parts. A general right 
to fish, it seems, is divisible into many narrower rights, such as 
a right to fish without a licence, a right to fish with a gill 
net, and even a right to possess a net. Taking away any one of 
these rights is an extinguishment of the narrow right, rather than 
a restriction on the general right to fish. One may wonder how 
far this process of fragmentation of rights will go. Is there a 
separate right to take every single species of fish that may be 
caught? Are different sorts of nets each the subject of a 
distinct right? What about different net sizes? 
There is another aspect of these section 35(1) decisions which is 
equally troublesome. If the effect of the section was to 
constitutionalize aboriginal and treaty rights just as they stood 
on April 17, 1982, that is, subject to any validly enacted 
limitations in force at that time, this means that those rights 
can be defined only b~ reference to the legislation which contains 
...,,,J 
those limitations. In other words, ordinary statutes, and even 
regulations made under delegated authority, must to some extent 
determine the meaning of terms contained in the Constitution. If 
this is correct, the result is somewhat startling. Under the 
Fisheries Act, the federal government has made separate sets of 
regulations for each province and territory in Canada, and in some 
cases for individual species of fish as well. Since these 
regulations vary from one part of the country to the other, what 
we have are at least twelve different sets of delegated 
legislation which must be consulted to find out the extent of the 
aboriginal and treaty rights to fish which have been recognized 
and affirmed by section 35(1). Nor is this all. If we look at 
these regulations more closely, we will discover that they contain 
precise provisions governing such matters as the species and 
quantities of fish which can be lawfully taken, the types of nets 
and other equipment which can be used, and even the size of the 
holes in certain kinds of nets. Though these minute provisions 
have not been incorporated into the Constitution as such, they 
must be consulted and applied like a template to the fishing 
rights of the aboriginal peoples to determine where the limits of 
those rights lie. Moreover, unless the word "existing" is read as 
meaning from time to time (which none of the decisions referred to 
above suggested), the template which is to be applied is that 
which existed on April 17, 1982. Where fishing is concerned, 
then, the aboriginal peoples' rights were "frozen" by these 
different sets of detailed regulations, which may have been 
amended since April 17, 1982, and which could be repealed, but 
which would nonetheless continue to limit the extent of those 
rights for the purpose of the Constitution. If this is so, C~nada 
must have one of the most bizarre constitutions in the world! 
[1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 
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This brings us to i£.~rrow v. The Queen, [1987] 1 C.N.L.R. 145, 
which is probably the most important case decided so far on the 
effect of section 35(1). This case involved the application of 
the Fisheries Act and the British Columbia Fishery (General) 
Regulations to the Musqueam Indian band. Under the regulations, 
the band had been issued an Indian food fish licence each year, 
starting in 1978, which authorized them to take salmon for food. 
In 1983, the licence was amended to reduce the length of drift 
nets which the Musqueams could use from 75 to 25 fathoms. The 
issue to be decided was whether this amendment was of any force or 
effect, in view of section 35(1) of the 1982 Constitution Act. 
Unlike the other cases we have looked at, Sparrow thus involved an 
amendment affecting Indian fishing rights made after section 35(1) 
came into force on April 17, 1982. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in a unanimous decision, 
distinguished between extinguishment and regulation of Indian 
fishing rights. As a consequence of the enactment of section 
35(1), an aboriginal right to fish for food can no longer be 
extinguished by legislation. However, it can still be regulated, 
as long as the regulations give it priority over commercial and 
sports fishing, and do not infringe on the aboriginal food fishery 
in the sense of reducing the available catch below that required 
for reasonable food and societal (i.e. ceremonial) needs. 
Moreover, regulations which "bear upon the exercise of the right 
may nonetheless be valid, but only if they can be reasonably 
justified as being necessary for the proper management and 
conservation of the resource or in the public interest" (p.178). 
Because there was not enough evidence to determine whether these 
criteria had been met in this instance, the Court of Appeal 
ordered a new trial. 
What is especially significant about the Sparrow case is the 
manner in which the Court of Appeal arrived at its conclusion that 
section 35(1) did not entirely take away Parliament's power to 
regulate aboriginal fishing rights. The Court said that section 
35(1) does not purport to revoke the power of Parliament under the 
Constitution Act, section 91, subheadings (12) and (24), to make 
laws in relation to sea coast and inland fisheries, and Indians 
and lands reserved for the· Indians. So "[t]he power to regulate 
fisheries, including Indian access to the fisheries, continues, 
subject only to the new constitutional guarantee that the 
aboriginal rights existing on April 17, 1982 may not be taken 
away" (p.177). The aboriginal right of the Musqueams to fish for 
food and ceremonial purposes has always been a regulated right 
(originally, it had been regulated by the Musqueams themselves). 
It continued to be. a regulated right on April 17, 1982. It has 
never been fixed, always taking its form from the circumstances in 
which it has existed. "If the interests of the Indians and other 
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Canadians in the fishery are to be protected", the Court concluded 
(at p.177), "then reasonable regulations to ensure the proper 
management and conservation of the resource must be continued." 
The Court of Appeal was thus able to avoid the absurdity of 
concluding that the 75-fathom net length in the Musqueam~' 
pre-1983 licences was constitutionally protected. It also avoided 
the fragmentation of aboriginal rights which we noticed earlier. 
The Court said (at p.178): 
It is necessary to distinguish between a right 
and the method by which the right may be 
exercised. The aboriginal right is not to 
take fish by any particular method or by a net 
of any particular length. It is to take fish 
for food purposes. The breadth of the right 
should be interpreted liberally in favour of 
the Indians. 
At the same time, however, the Court seriously limited the 
protection accorded by section 35(1). Not only do past 
limitations on aboriginal rights continue to be effective, but 
those limitations can even be extended, so long as this is done 
for the purposes of management and conservation, and does not 
extinguish or unreasonably infringe the right in question. 
Moreover, in the case of conflict between aboriginal rights and 
conservation, conservation comes first. 
What the Court of Appeal seems to have done in Sparrow is to read 
a "reasonable limits" restriction into the rights protected by 
section 35(1). Whether or not this is de~irable on policy 
grounds, there is nothing in the 1982 Constitution Act itself 
which justifies this approach. We have seen that section 35 is 
located outside the Charter, and is therefore beyond the reach of 
section 1. The implication which should be drawn from this is 
that the framers of the Act intended section 35 to stand on its 
own, free from the limitations to which Charter rights are 
subjected. 
My own view of Sparrow is that it is a subversive decision. If 
the Court of Appeal's interpretation of section 35(1) is generally 
adopted, then I think the protection which the section purports to 
give to aboriginal and treaty rights will end up being largely 
illusory, at least insofar as hunting and fishing rights are 
concerned. 
Our discussion has centred primarily on the effect of section 
35(1) on federal legislative power. Although we do not have time 
to pursue the matter further today, it must nonetheless be 
remembered that provincial legislative power is subject to the 
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section as well. In the prairie provinces, however, the Natural 
Resources Transfer Agreements continue to apply. In R. v. Horse, 
[1984] 4 C.N.L.R. 99, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that, 
with regard to provincial game laws, treaty hunting and fishing 
rights were merged and consolidated by those agreements, which are 
part of the Constitution of Canada. The Court decided that 
section 35(1) must be read subject to the agreements, and for this 
reason it has no effect on the application of provincial game laws 
to treaty Indians under the agreements. An appeal of this 
decision was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 19, 
1987, but a judgment has not yet been delivered. 
Given the confused state of the present case law on section 35(1), 
it is too early to provide an adequate assessment of its impact. 
The first Supreme Court decisions on this section are going to be 
extremely important because they are going to set the tone and 
create the precedential framework for future decisions. It is 
therefore essential that any cases taken to the Supreme Court as 
test cases be supported by favourable factual circumstances and 
superior legal argument. At stake will be the rights not only of 
those directly involved, but of all the ahorlginal people of 
Canada, present and future. 
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